Warmatrix

Afghan guerrillas on top of a crashed Mi-24 near Kabul

The Soviet-Afghan War was a guerrilla war that sped the disintegration of the USSR. But it also wrecked Afghanistan itself and helped the rise of militant islamic fundamentalism.
In 1978 CE, in the Saur Revolution, the Afghan army, led by Nur Mohammad Taraki, staged a coup and overthrew the government of Mohammed Daoud Khan, who had came to power by a coup of his own five years earlier. The new marxist government started several reforms that caused resent among many conservative islamic Afghans, who started a rebellion that was harshly repressed. Many Afghan soldiers deserted or even joined the rebels. The government, divided into several factions, applied for military help from the USSR, which had supported the country for decades. At first the Soviets told it to sort out its own problems, but when Taraki was replaced by his prime minister in late 1979 CE, changed their minds, even though not unanimous. They sent in troops disguised as Afghans who staged another coup. The frontline infiltrators were soon followed by two more divisions, to a total of some 30,000 men, entering the country by one air route and two land routes. Soon this force was increased to about 100,000 men.
The Soviets hoped that their mere presence would bring peace and order. Instead it fostered hostile feelings of nationalism. The rebels took up the name "mujahideen", 'they who wage jihad', making religion part of their struggle. They fought the Soviets, who at first battered them with superior firepower. But soon the mujahideen were waging a guerrilla war, controlling the mountains and large parts of the countryside, while the Soviets held the cities and main roads, the same that they had used during the invasion. The rebels practiced many sabotage operations, targeting power lines, public buildings and sometimes assassinating communists.
The Soviet troops were neither equipped, trained, nor organized for counter-insurgency warfare. Their large combined arms formations proved expensive and ineffective in the mountains, where they had to fight small elusive groups of Afghans. The Soviets tried to intimidate the latter by bombing villages and livestock, laying mines and using chemical weapons, but this only inflamed the resistance. Search and destroy missions were launched against guerrillas, who retreated into the mountains when they were attacked. Because the civilian population supported the resistance fighters, the Soviets tried to terrorize them into submission with brutal attacks, to no avail. Another Soviet tactic was infiltration of the mujahideen, spreading misinformation and stirring infighting. The rebels were divided into many groups and countless subgroups, yet united by their aversion to the communists. There was no single rebellion leader, but a heterogeneous of factions led by warlords. The mujahideen were for a large part illiterate farmers and herders, brave and skilled fighters, though ill-disciplined. Fighting on native soil, supported by civilians, they had an excellent intelligence network and dominated the combat at night.
In fighting their enemy, Soviet special forces and mountain troops performed rather well, though were a minority. Most Soviet soldiers, about 80%, were conscripts who were bullied and underpaid. Their supply of water, food and ammunition was strangled by the enemy; their clothing was unsuited to the rugged Afghan terrain and climate. Many tried to push away the horrors of war with booze and locally produced opium. They treated the Afghan civilians with contempt, stealing, raping and killing on a wide scale. The Afghan army was not treated much better; they were used as an auxiliary infantry force, while the Soviets fought with vehicles and heavy weapons. This caused resentment and contributed to heavy desertion among the Afghan soldiers.
During the war, the Red Army slowly adapted. It reduced the role of its tanks and mechanized infantry. More use was made of light infantry and airmobile troops, who were issued heavier weapons. Ground forces were strengthened by helicopters, which provided very important transport and mobile firepower. The operational structure of the army was more decentralized, allowing small units more initiative. Despite these changes, it failed to destroy the Afghan resistance. Throughout the war western, muslim and communist foreign countries alike supplied the mujahideen with money and weapons. Pakistan served as a base of operations for Pashtun fighters, where they could rest and regroup. It was rewarded by an economic boost, but also skirmishes with the Soviets and an influx of many Afghan refugees. Arabian salafists mustered a small force of around 2,000 'Afghan Arabs' who did more harm than good by butchering the defenders of Jalalabad in 1989 CE, hardening the resolve of the Afghan communists. From 1984 CE China and the USA started to supply the mujahideen with anti-aircraft weapons. Two years later the USA joined in with more effective portable Stinger surface-to-air missiles. These forced Soviet aircraft to fly at higher altitudes, significantly reducing their effectiveness.
The USSR, faced with an unwinnable war in Afghanistan plus economic trouble and demoralized soldiers at home, prepared to pull out of the country as early as 1985 CE. Like the Americans did in the Vietnam War, they started to train and equip the Afghan army. The official announcement of the withdrawal of Soviet troops came in 1987 CE, the actual move from 1988 CE to 1989 CE. The communist Afghan government, headed by several different leaders in succession, hung on for three more years. Afterwards anarchy ruled, while warlords fought each other, until the Taliban managed to conquer most of the country in 1996 CE.
During the war, out of 640,000 men who served in it, the Soviets lost 40,000 - 50,000, while several hundred thousand were wounded or stricken with disease. They also lost 350 helicopters, 200 other aircraft, 150 tanks, 1,300 infantry fighting vehicles, 400 artillery guns and mortars and 11,000 trucks. The Afghan army lost several tens of thousands of men, at least as many from to desertion as from fighting. The mujahideen lost around 80,000 lives and an equal number were wounded. Between 1 and 1½ million civilians were killed, 3 million wounded and 5 - 8 million forced to leave their homes. Cities were bombed; most irrigation systems were destroyed; countless land mines kept on killing people until long after the war. The country, already poor before the war, came out even more destitute. The USSR suffered too; damage to its economy and prestige hastened the process towards its breakup in 1991 CE and the end of the Cold War.